| Repeated Moral Hazard and Contracts with Memory: The Case of Risk‐Neutrality S Ohlendorf, P Schmitz International Economic Review, 2012 | 67 | 2012 |
| Infinitely repeated games with public monitoring and monetary transfers S Goldlücke, S Kranz Journal of Economic Theory 147 (3), 1191-1221, 2012 | 43 | 2012 |
| Investments as signals of outside options S Goldlücke, PW Schmitz Journal of Economic Theory 150, 683-708, 2014 | 34 | 2014 |
| Renegotiation-proof relational contracts S Goldlücke, S Kranz Games and Economic Behavior 80, 157-178, 2013 | 34* | 2013 |
| Expectation damages, divisible contracts, and bilateral investment S Ohlendorf The American Economic Review, 2009 | 31 | 2009 |
| Strategic gaze: An interactive eye-tracking study J Hausfeld, K von Hesler, S Goldlücke Experimental economics 24, 177-205, 2021 | 18 | 2021 |
| Why agents need discretion: The business judgment rule as optimal standard of care A Engert, S Goldlücke Review of Law & Economics 13 (1), 20150033, 2017 | 16 | 2017 |
| Delegation, monitoring, and relational contracts S Goldlücke, S Kranz Economics Letters 117 (2), 405-407, 2012 | 10 | 2012 |
| Pollution claim settlements reconsidered: Hidden information and bounded payments S Goldlücke, PW Schmitz European Economic Review 110, 211-222, 2018 | 7 | 2018 |
| Reconciling Relational Contracting and Hold-up: A Model of Repeated Negotiations S Goldlücke, S Kranz Journal of the European Economic Association 21 (3), 864-906, 2023 | 6 | 2023 |
| The multiple-volunteers principle S Goldlücke, T Tröger CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP15580, 2020 | 4 | 2020 |
| Discounted stochastic games with voluntary transfers S Goldlücke, S Kranz Economic Theory 66, 235-263, 2018 | 4 | 2018 |
| Assigning an unpleasant task without payment S Goldlücke, T Tröger Working Paper Series 18, 2018 | 4 | 2018 |
| Strategic recruiting in ongoing hierarchies S Goldlücke Economics letters 156, 176-178, 2017 | 4 | 2017 |
| The Multiple-Volunteers Principle for Unpleasant Tasks and for Pleasant Tasks S Goldlücke, T Tröger | | 2023 |
| The Multiple-Volunteers Principle for Assigning Unpleasant and Pleasant Tasks S Goldluecke, T Troeger CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, 2023 | | 2023 |
| Hidden Overtime: Optimal Contracts with (Self-) Deceptive Effort Reports J Alasalmi, S Goldlücke, M Jordan Centre for Economic Policy Research, 2023 | | 2023 |
| Expectation Damages, Divisible Contracts, and Bilateral Investment S Goldlücke | | 2009 |
| Social Planning with Partial Knowledge of Social Interactions. Comment S Kranz, S Ohlendorf | | 2009 |
| Strategic recruiting in ongoing hierarchies Economics Letters, 0 | | |
