Dan S. Felsenthal
Dan S. Felsenthal
School of Political Sciences, University of Haifa, Israel
Bestätigte E-Mail-Adresse bei
Zitiert von
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The measurement of voting power: Theory and practice, problems and paradoxes
DS Felsenthal, M Machover
The Measurement of Voting Power, 1998
The Treaty of Nice and qualified majority voting
DS Felsenthal, M Machover
Social Choice and Welfare 18 (3), 431-464, 2001
Ternary voting games
DS Felsenthal, M Machover
International journal of game theory 26, 335-351, 1997
A priori voting power: what is it all about?
DS Felsenthal, M Machover
Political Studies Review 2 (1), 1-23, 2004
Postulates and paradoxes of relative voting power—a critical re-appraisal
DS Felsenthal, M Machover
Theory and Decision 38, 195-229, 1995
Voting power measurement: a story of misreinvention
DS Felsenthal, M Machover
Social choice and welfare 25, 485-506, 2005
Analysis of QM rules in the draft constitution for Europe proposed by the European Convention, 2003
DS Felsenthal, M Machover
Social Choice and Welfare 23 (1), 1-20, 2004
Two-person bargaining behavior in fixed discounting factors games with infinite horizon
E Weg, A Rapoport, DS Felsenthal
Games and Economic Behavior 2 (1), 76-95, 1990
Myths and meanings of voting power: comments on a symposium
DS Felsenthal, M Machover
Journal of Theoretical Politics 13 (1), 81-97, 2001
The bicameral postulates and indices of a priori voting power
DS Felsenthal, M Machover, W Zwicker
Theory and Decision 44 (1), 83-116, 1998
The weighted voting rule in the EU's Council of Ministers, 1958–1995: Intentions and outcomes
DS Felsenthal, M Machover
Electoral Studies 16 (1), 33-47, 1997
Self-binding commitments, the inducement of trust, social choice, and the theory of international cooperation
Z Maoz, DS Felsenthal
International Studies Quarterly 31 (2), 177-200, 1987
Review of paradoxes afflicting procedures for electing a single candidate
DS Felsenthal
Electoral systems: Paradoxes, assumptions, and procedures, 19-91, 2011
Effects of fixed costs in two-person sequential bargaining
A Rapoport, A Rapoport
Experimental Studies of Interactive Decisions, 119-137, 1990
On combining approval with disapproval voting
DS Felsenthal
Behavioral Science 34 (1), 53-60, 1989
Enlargement of the EU and Weighted Voting in its Council of Ministers
DS Felsenthal, M Machover
London School of Economics and Political Science, 2000
Annexations and alliances: When are blocs advantageous a priori?
DS Felsenthal, M Machover
Social Choice and Welfare 19, 295-312, 2002
An empirical evaluation of six voting procedures: do they really make any difference?
DS Felsenthal, Z Maoz, A Rapoport
British Journal of Political Science 23 (1), 1-27, 1993
Minimizing the mean majority deficit: The second square-root rule
DS Felsenthal, M Machover
Mathematical Social Sciences 37 (1), 25-37, 1999
The Majority Judgement voting procedure: a critical evaluation
DS Felsenthal, M Machover
Homo oeconomicus 25 (3/4), 319-334, 2008
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