Folgen
Wei Li
Titel
Zitiert von
Zitiert von
Jahr
Changing one's mind when the facts change: incentives of experts and the design of reporting protocols
W Li
The Review of Economic Studies 74 (4), 1175-1194, 2007
572007
Misinformation
L Hao, W Li
International Economic Review 54 (1), 253-277, 2013
402013
Drive and talent
B Kőszegi, W Li
Journal of the European Economic Association 6 (1), 210-236, 2008
302008
Peddling influence through intermediaries
W Li
American Economic Review 100 (3), 1136-1162, 2010
282010
Learning in local networks
W Li, X Tan
Working paper. 4.1, 2017
26*2017
Optimal limited authority for principal
A Kolotilin, H Li, W Li
Journal of Economic Theory 148 (6), 2344-2382, 2013
232013
Well‐Informed Intermediaries In Strategic Communication
W Li
Economic Inquiry 50 (2), 380-398, 2012
72012
Mind changes and the design of reporting protocols
W Li
Theory workshop papers, 2004
72004
Optimal delegation with limited commitment
H Li, W Li
University of Toronto working, 2009
52009
Peddling influence through intermediaries: Propaganda
W Li
University of California, Riverside working paper, 2007
32007
Ambition and Talent
B Koszegi, W Li
IEHAS Discussion Papers, 2002
32002
Cognitively-constrained learning from neighbors
W Li, X Tan
Games and Economic Behavior 129, 32-54, 2021
22021
Peddling influence through well informed intermediaries
W Li
USC FBE Applied Economics Workshop, Riverside, 2007
22007
Private Career Concerns
H Li, W Li
mimeo, 2021
12021
Signaling drive over the long term
W Li
Economics Letters 109 (3), 164-167, 2010
2010
American Economic Association
W Li
The American Economic Review 100 (3), 1136-1162, 2010
2010
Mind Changes in Designing Reporting Systems
W Li
2003
Essays on information and incentives
W Li
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2003
2003
Ambition and Talent
B Kőszegi, W Li
Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 2002
2002
A Model of Gossip
W Li
2002
Das System kann den Vorgang jetzt nicht ausführen. Versuchen Sie es später erneut.
Artikel 1–20