| On the definition of the strategic stability of equilibria J Hillas Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1365-1390, 1990 | 166 | 1990 |
| Foundations of strategic equilibrium J Hillas, E Kohlberg Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications 3, 1597-1663, 2002 | 104 | 2002 |
| On the relation among some definitions of strategic stability J Hillas, M Jansen, J Potters, D Vermeulen Mathematics of Operations Research 26 (3), 611-635, 2001 | 34 | 2001 |
| Sequential equilibria and stable sets of beliefs J Hillas Journal of Economic Theory 64 (1), 78-102, 1994 | 20 | 1994 |
| How much of forward induction is implied by backward induction and ordinality J Hillas University of Auckland, New Zealand, 1994 | 16 | 1994 |
| Backward induction in games without perfect recall J Hillas, D Kvasov Games and Economic Behavior 124, 207-218, 2020 | 14 | 2020 |
| Dominance rationality: A unified approach J Hillas, D Samet Games and Economic Behavior 119, 189-196, 2020 | 12 | 2020 |
| Weak dominance: a mystery cracked J Hillas, D Samet Technical Report, Tel Aviv University, 2014 | 10 | 2014 |
| On the relation between perfect equilibria in extensive form games and proper equilibria in normal form games J Hillas University of Auckland, 1996 | 10 | 1996 |
| Sequential equilibria and stable sets of beliefs J Hillas Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, 1992 | 9 | 1992 |
| A real algebraic proof of the generic equivalence of quasi-perfect and sequential equilibria J Hillas, T Kao, A Schiff unpublished, 2016 | 8 | 2016 |
| CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE THEORY OF MARKET SCREENING. JB Hillas | 7 | 1988 |
| On the finiteness of stable sets J Hillas, D Vermeulen, M Jansen International Journal of Game Theory 26, 275-278, 1997 | 6 | 1997 |
| Backward induction in nonlinear games J Hillas, D Kvasov Unpublished manuscript, 2020 | 5 | 2020 |
| Non-probabilistic correlated equilibrium as an expression of non-Bayesian rationality,” a manuscript J Hillas, D Samet | 5 | 2013 |
| A semi-algebraic proof of the generic equivalence of quasi-perfect and sequential equilibria. University of Auckland J Hillas, T Kao, A Schiff mimeo, 2002 | 5 | 2002 |
| Independence of inadmissible strategies and best reply stability: a direct proof J Hillas, M Jansen, J Potters, D Vermeulen International Journal of Game Theory 32, 371-377, 2004 | 4 | 2004 |
| Repeated games with partial monitoring: The stochastic signaling case J Hillas, M Liu Game Theory and Information 9605001, 1996 | 4 | 1996 |
| On a theorem of Blume and Zame J Hillas, T Kao, A Schiff | 3 | 2017 |
| Correlated equilibria of two person repeated games with random signals J Hillas, M Liu International Journal of Game Theory 45, 137-153, 2016 | 3 | 2016 |
