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Ella Segev
Ella Segev
Associate Professor, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Bestätigte E-Mail-Adresse bei mail.huji.ac.il
Titel
Zitiert von
Zitiert von
Jahr
Social learning and the design of new experience goods
P Feldman, Y Papanastasiou, E Segev
Management Science 65 (4), 1502-1519, 2019
1112019
The optimal prize structure of symmetric Tullock contests
P Schweinzer, E Segev
Public Choice 153, 69-82, 2012
1062012
Crowdsourcing contests
E Segev
European Journal of Operational Research 281 (2), 241-255, 2020
752020
Defining knowledge in terms of belief: The modal logic perspective
JY Halpern, D Samet, E Segev
The Review of Symbolic Logic 2 (3), 469-487, 2009
682009
The evolutionary role of toughness in bargaining
A Heifetz, E Segev
Games and Economic Behavior 49 (1), 117-134, 2004
602004
Multi-stage sequential all-pay auctions
E Segev, A Sela
European Economic Review 70, 371-382, 2014
572014
Sequential all-pay auctions with head starts
E Segev, A Sela
Social Choice and Welfare 43, 893-923, 2014
422014
Market design with endogenous preferences
A Heifetz, E Segev, E Talley
Games and Economic Behavior 58 (1), 121-153, 2007
232007
Impact of a financial risk-sharing scheme on budget-impact estimations: a game-theoretic approach
A Gavious, D Greenberg, A Hammerman, E Segev
The European Journal of Health Economics 15, 553-561, 2014
182014
Heterogeneous risk/loss aversion in complete information all-pay auctions
ZC Chen, D Ong, E Segev
European Economic Review 95, 23-37, 2017
172017
Escalation and delay in protracted international conflicts
A Heifetz, E Segev
Mathematical Social Sciences 49 (1), 17-37, 2005
17*2005
On definability in multimodal logic
JY Halpern, D Samet, E Segev
The Review of Symbolic Logic 2 (3), 451-468, 2009
12*2009
The important role of time limits when consumers choose their time in service
P Feldman, E Segev
Management Science, 2022
8*2022
Sequential all-pay auctions with noisy outputs
E Segev, A Sela
Journal of Mathematical Economics 50, 251-261, 2014
72014
Sequential bidding in asymmetric first price auctions
G Cohensius, E Segev
The BE Journal of Theoretical Economics 18 (1), 20160196, 2017
52017
Efficiency levels in sequential auctions with dynamic arrivals
R Lavi, E Segev
International Journal of Game Theory 43, 791-819, 2014
5*2014
Managed trade with imperfect information
G Hochman, E Segev
International Economic Review 51 (1), 187-211, 2010
52010
A Tullock-contest-based approach for cyber security investments
D Iliaev, S Oren, E Segev
Annals of Operations Research 320 (1), 61-84, 2023
42023
Picking the Right Winner: Why Tie-Breaking in Crowdsourcing Contests Matters.
C Haggiag, S Oren, E Segev
IJCAI, 307-313, 2022
42022
Efficiency of sequential english auctions with dynamic arrivals.
O Compte, R Lavi, E Segev
EC, 369, 2012
32012
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