jesse fried
jesse fried
Professor of Law, Harvard Law School
Verified email at law.harvard.edu
Title
Cited by
Cited by
Year
Pay without performance: The unfulfilled promise of executive compensation
LA Bebchuk, JM Fried
Harvard University Press, 2009
31092009
Executive compensation as an agency problem
LA Bebchuk, JM Fried
Journal of economic perspectives 17 (3), 71-92, 2003
30082003
Managerial power and rent extraction in the design of executive compensation
LA Bebchuk, JM Fried, DI Walker
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series, 2002
24402002
Pay without performance: Overview of the issues
LA Bebchuk, JM Fried
Journal of applied corporate finance 17 (4), 8-23, 2005
1059*2005
The uneasy case for the priority of secured claims in bankruptcy
LA Bebchuk, JM Fried
Yale Lj 105, 857, 1995
6071995
Paying for long-term performance
LA Bebchuk, JM Fried
University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 1915-1959, 2010
3472010
Agency costs of venture capitalist control in startups
JM Fried, M Ganor
NYUL rev. 81, 967, 2006
2082006
Reducing the profitability of corporate insider trading through pretrading disclosure
JM Fried
S. Cal. L. Rev. 71, 303, 1997
1911997
Is US CEO compensation inefficient pay without performance?
JE Core, WR Guay, RS Thomas
Michigan Law Review 103 (6), 1142-1185, 2005
1802005
Stealth compensation via retirement benefits
LA Bebchuk, JM Fried
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series, 2004
1232004
Insider signaling and insider trading with repurchase tender offers
JM Fried
The University of Chicago Law Review, 421-477, 2000
1192000
The uneasy case for the priority of secured claims in bankruptcy: further thoughts and a reply to critics
LA Bebchuk, J Fried
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series, 1998
1181998
Executive compensation in America: optimal contracting or extraction of rents?
LA Bebchuk, JM Fried, DI Walker
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series, 2001
1102001
Excess-pay clawbacks
J Fried
J. Corp. L. 36, 721, 2010
1082010
Executive compensation at Fannie Mae: A case study of perverse incentives, nonperformance pay, and camouflage
LA Bebchuk, JM Fried
J. Corp. L. 30, 807, 2004
1052004
Informed trading and false signaling with open market repurchases
JM Fried
Calif. L. Rev. 93, 1323, 2005
1032005
Rationalizing criminal forfeiture
DJ Fried
J. Crim. L. & Criminology 79, 328, 1988
981988
Open market repurchases: signaling or managerial opportunism?
JM Fried
Theoretical inquiries in Law 2 (2), 2001
962001
The academic tournament over executive compensation
WW Bratton
Calif. L. Rev. 93, 1557, 2005
922005
The uneasy case for favoring long-term shareholders
JM Fried
Yale LJ 124, 1554, 2014
882014
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Articles 1–20