| LS Penrose's limit theorem: proof of some special cases I Lindner, M Machover Mathematical Social Sciences 47 (1), 37-49, 2004 | 84 | 2004 |
| From tradition to modernity: Economic growth in a small world I Lindner, H Strulik Journal of Development Economics 109, 17-29, 2014 | 38 | 2014 |
| Why not Africa?–Growth and welfare effects of secure property rights I Lindner, H Strulik Public Choice 120 (1), 143-167, 2004 | 31 | 2004 |
| Cases where the Penrose limit theorem does not hold I Lindner, G Owen Mathematical Social Sciences 53 (3), 232-238, 2007 | 21 | 2007 |
| Distributive politics and economic growth: the Markovian Stackelberg solution I Lindner, H Strulik Economic Theory 23, 439-444 (2004), 2004 | 19 | 2004 |
| Networks and collective action R Flores, M Koster, I Lindner, E Molina Social Networks 34 (4), 570-584, 2012 | 18 | 2012 |
| Social fractionalization, endogenous appropriation norms, and economic development I Lindner, H Strulik Economica 75 (298), 244-258, 2008 | 14 | 2008 |
| Power measures in large weighted voting games: Asymptotic properties and numerical methods I Lindner Staats-und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg Carl von Ossietzky, 2004 | 14 | 2004 |
| A special case of Penrose’s limit theorem when abstention is allowed I Lindner Theory and Decision 64, 495-518, 2008 | 12 | 2008 |
| The power of a collectivity to act in weighted voting games with many small voters I Lindner Social Choice and Welfare 30, 581-601, 2008 | 12 | 2008 |
| Mediation as signal MJ Holler, I Lindner European Journal of Law and Economics 17, 165-173, 2004 | 11 | 2004 |
| The great divergence: A network approach I Lindner, H Strulik Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 14-033/II, 2014 | 10 | 2014 |
| Power measures in large weighted voting games I Lindner Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, University of Hamburg, 2004 | 10 | 2004 |
| Property rights and growth I Lindner, H Strulik University of Cambridge, Department of Applied Economics, 1999 | 8 | 1999 |
| Innovation and inequality in a small world I Lindner, H Strulik International Economic Review 61 (2), 683-719, 2020 | 7 | 2020 |
| A simple “market value” bargaining model for weighted voting games: characterization and limit theorems G Owen, I Lindner, SL Feld, B Grofman, L Ray International Journal of Game Theory 35, 111-128, 2006 | 6 | 2006 |
| Naïve learning in social networks with random communication JP Huang, B Heidergott, I Lindner Social Networks 58, 1-11, 2019 | 5 | 2019 |
| A generalization of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem to weighted voting games with many small voters I Lindner Economic Theory 35 (3), 607-611, 2008 | 5 | 2008 |
| The prediction value M Koster, S Kurz, I Lindner, S Napel Social Choice and Welfare 48, 433-460, 2017 | 4 | 2017 |
| Diffusion of behavior in network games with threshold dynamics JP Huang, M Koster, I Lindner Mathematical Social Sciences 84, 109-118, 2016 | 4 | 2016 |
