Folgen
Ioannis Caragiannis
Ioannis Caragiannis
Professor of Computer Science, Aarhus University
Bestätigte E-Mail-Adresse bei cs.au.dk - Startseite
Titel
Zitiert von
Zitiert von
Jahr
The unreasonable fairness of maximum Nash welfare
I Caragiannis, D Kurokawa, H Moulin, AD Procaccia, N Shah, J Wang
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC) 7 (3), 1-32, 2019
4282019
Optimal social choice functions: A utilitarian view
C Boutilier, I Caragiannis, S Haber, T Lu, AD Procaccia, O Sheffet
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 197-214, 2012
1872012
Tight bounds for selfish and greedy load balancing
I Caragiannis, M Flammini, C Kaklamanis, P Kanellopoulos, L Moscardelli
Algorithmica 61 (3), 606-637, 2011
180*2011
Bounding the inefficiency of outcomes in generalized second price auctions
I Caragiannis, C Kaklamanis, P Kanellopoulos, M Kyropoulou, B Lucier, ...
Journal of Economic Theory 156, 343-388, 2015
163*2015
The efficiency of fair division
I Caragiannis, C Kaklamanis, P Kanellopoulos, M Kyropoulou
Theory of Computing Systems 50 (4), 589-610, 2012
1602012
When do noisy votes reveal the truth?
I Caragiannis, AD Procaccia, N Shah
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC) 4 (3), 1-30, 2016
1502016
Voting almost maximizes social welfare despite limited communication
I Caragiannis, AD Procaccia
Artificial Intelligence 175 (9-10), 1655-1671, 2011
1022011
Fair allocation of indivisible goods and chores
H Aziz, I Caragiannis, A Igarashi, T Walsh
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 36 (1), 1-21, 2022
90*2022
Geometric clustering to minimize the sum of cluster sizes
V Bilo, I Caragiannis, C Kaklamanis, P Kanellopoulos
European Symposium on Algorithms, 460-471, 2005
902005
How bad is selfish voting?
S Brânzei, I Caragiannis, J Morgenstern, AD Procaccia
Twenty-Seventh AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2013
862013
Subset selection via implicit utilitarian voting
I Caragiannis, S Nath, AD Procaccia, N Shah
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 58, 123-152, 2017
842017
Efficient coordination mechanisms for unrelated machine scheduling
I Caragiannis
Algorithmica 66 (3), 512-540, 2013
812013
Taxes for linear atomic congestion games
I Caragiannis, C Kaklamanis, P Kanellopoulos
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG) 7 (1), 13, 2010
75*2010
Envy-freeness up to any item with high Nash welfare: The virtue of donating items
I Caragiannis, N Gravin, X Huang
Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 527-545, 2019
692019
On the approximability of Dodgson and Young elections
I Caragiannis, JA Covey, M Feldman, CM Homan, C Kaklamanis, ...
Artificial Intelligence 187, 31-51, 2012
692012
Communication in wireless networks with directional antennas
I Caragiannis, C Kaklamanis, E Kranakis, D Krizanc, A Wiese
Proceedings of the twentieth annual symposium on Parallelism in algorithms …, 2008
692008
Almost envy-free allocations with connected bundles
V Bilò, I Caragiannis, M Flammini, A Igarashi, G Monaco, D Peters, ...
Games and Economic Behavior 131, 197-221, 2022
662022
Energy-efficient wireless network design
I Caragiannis, C Kaklamanis, P Kanellopoulos
Theory of Computing Systems 39 (5), 593-617, 2006
652006
Efficient computation of approximate pure Nash equilibria in congestion games
I Caragiannis, A Fanelli, N Gravin, A Skopalik
2011 IEEE 52nd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 532-541, 2011
582011
Socially desirable approximations for Dodgson’s voting rule
I Caragiannis, C Kaklamanis, N Karanikolas, AD Procaccia
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG) 10 (2), 1-28, 2014
562014
Das System kann den Vorgang jetzt nicht ausführen. Versuchen Sie es später erneut.
Artikel 1–20