Edoardo Grillo
TitleCited byYear
Interactive epistemology and solution concepts for games with asymmetric information
P Battigalli, A Di Tillio, E Grillo, A Penta
The BE Journal of Theoretical Economics 11 (1), 2011
412011
The hidden cost of raising voters’ expectations: Reference dependence and politicians’ credibility
E Grillo
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 130, 126-143, 2016
16*2016
War with crazy types
A Acharya, E Grillo
Political Science Research and Methods 3 (2), 281-307, 2015
162015
A model of educational investment, social concerns, and inequality
A Gallice, E Grillo
The Scandinavian Journal of Economics 121 (4), 1620-1646, 2019
8*2019
Economic and social-class voting in a model of redistribution with social concerns
A Gallice, E Grillo
Journal of the European Economic Association, 2018
8*2018
A Behavioral Foundation for Audience Costs
A Acharya, E Grillo
Quarterly Journal of Political Science 14 (2), 159-190, 2019
62019
Dynamic contracting with limited liability constraints
E Grillo, J Ortner
Collegio Carlo Alberto and Boston University, 2018
62018
Reference Dependence, Risky Projects and Credible Information Transmission
E Grillo
Collegio Carlo Alberto Notebooks, 2013
32013
Dynamic Campaign Spending
A Acharya, E Grillo, T Sugaya, E Turkel
URL: http://stanford. edu/avidit/campaigns. pdf, 2019
22019
Opportunistic Authoritarians, Reference-Dependent Preferences, and Democratic Backsliding
E Grillo, C Prato
Reference-Dependent Preferences, and Democratic Backsliding (October 25, 2019), 2019
2019
Sanctions and Incentives to Repudiate External Debt
C de Bassa Scheresberg, E Grillo, F Passarelli
2017
ESSAYS ON STRATEGIC INFORMATION TRANSMISSION
E Grillo
2012
The system can't perform the operation now. Try again later.
Articles 1–12