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Takuo Sugaya
Takuo Sugaya
Stanford GSB
Verified email at stanford.edu - Homepage
Title
Cited by
Cited by
Year
Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for δ→ 1 and a Folk Theorem
J Hörner, T Sugaya, S Takahashi, N Vieille
Econometrica 79 (4), 1277-1318, 2011
1372011
Folk theorem in repeated games with private monitoring
T Sugaya
The Review of Economic Studies 89 (4), 2201-2256, 2022
1022022
Measuring the incentive to collude: the vitamin cartels, 1990–99
M Igami, T Sugaya
The Review of Economic Studies 89 (3), 1460-1494, 2022
77*2022
Asynchronicity and coordination in common and opposing interest games
R Calcagno, Y Kamada, S Lovo, T Sugaya
Theoretical Economics 9 (2), 409-434, 2014
65*2014
The revelation principle in multistage games
T Sugaya, A Wolitzky
The Review of Economic Studies 88 (3), 1503-1540, 2021
532021
Maintaining privacy in cartels
T Sugaya, A Wolitzky
Journal of Political Economy 126 (6), 2569-2607, 2018
402018
The folk theorem in repeated games with anonymous random matching
J Deb, T Sugaya, A Wolitzky
Econometrica 88 (3), 917-964, 2020
302020
Bounding equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring
T Sugaya, A Wolitzky
Theoretical Economics 12 (2), 691-729, 2017
30*2017
Market competition and political influence: An integrated approach
S Callander, D Foarta, T Sugaya
Econometrica 90 (6), 2723-2753, 2022
272022
Optimal timing of policy announcements in dynamic election campaigns
Y Kamada, T Sugaya
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 135 (3), 1725-1797, 2020
27*2020
Coordination failure in repeated games with private monitoring
T Sugaya, S Takahashi
Journal of Economic Theory 148 (5), 1891-1928, 2013
222013
Communication and community enforcement
T Sugaya, A Wolitzky
Journal of Political Economy 129 (9), 2595-2628, 2021
182021
Characterizing the limit set of perfect and public equilibrium payoffs with unequal discounting
T Sugaya
Theoretical Economics 10 (3), 691-717, 2015
182015
Common learning and cooperation in repeated games
T Sugaya, Y Yamamoto
Theoretical Economics 15 (3), 1175-1219, 2020
16*2020
A few bad apples spoil the barrel: An Anti-folk Theorem for anonymous repeated games with incomplete information
T Sugaya, A Wolitzky
American Economic Review 110 (12), 3817-3835, 2020
152020
Belief-free review-strategy equilibrium without conditional independence
T Sugaya
Unpublished paper, Stanford Graduate School of Business.[1180], 2012
132012
Dynamic Campaign Spending
A Acharya, E Grillo, T Sugaya, E Turkel
URL: http://stanford. edu/avidit/campaigns. pdf, 2019
12*2019
Characterizing the limit set of PPE payoffs with unequal discounting
T Sugaya
Princeton University, 2010
112010
Wait-and-see or step in? dynamics of interventions
D Foarta, T Sugaya
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 13 (1), 399-425, 2021
9*2021
The dynamics of a policy outcome: Market response and bureaucratic enforcement of a policy change
S Callander, D Foarta, T Sugaya
American Journal of Political Science, 2022
82022
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