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Anmol Ratan
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Multi-dimensional reference-dependent preferences in sealed-bid auctions–how (most) laboratory experiments differ from the field
A Lange, A Ratan
Games and Economic Behavior 68 (2), 634-645, 2010
1512010
Anticipated regret or endowment effect? A reconsideration of exchange asymmetry in laboratory experiments
A Ratan
The BE Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy 14 (1), 277-298, 2014
172014
Does regret matter in first-price auctions?
A Ratan, Y Wen
Economics letters 143, 114-117, 2016
102016
Reference-dependent preferences in first price auctions
A Ratan
Working Paper, University of Maryland, 2009
82009
Does displaying probabilities affect bidding in first-price auctions?
A Ratan
Economics letters 126, 119-121, 2015
72015
Profitability, efficiency, and inequality in double auction markets with snipers
P Brewer, A Ratan
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 164, 486-499, 2019
52019
Disentangling risk aversion and loss aversion in first-price auctions: An empirical approach
DH Kim, A Ratan
European Economic Review 150, 104284, 2022
32022
Is Decision Regret relevant for Auctions? A Reconsideration of Anticipated Regret in First Price Auctions
A Ratan
Monash University, mimeo, 2013
32013
Loss aversion in asymmetric anti‐coordination games
Y Wen, S Masschelein, A Ratan
Southern Economic Journal 88 (4), 1549-1573, 2022
12022
Detection of Loss-Aversion in Auctions against Pre-programmed Computers
DH Kim, A Ratan
Available at SSRN 4169478, 2022
2022
Data and replication supplement for double auction markets with snipers
P Brewer, A Ratan
Data in brief 27, 104729, 2019
2019
Double Auction Market Trading and Income Inequality: An initial investigation
P Brewer, A Ratan
Monash Economics Working Papers, 2017
2017
Tests of Mixed Strategy Equilibrium in Games: Role of feedback in repeated game design
N Anbarci, Y Wen, A Ratan
Monash Economics Working Papers, 2017
2017
The Double Auction Market and Inequality
P Brewer, A Ratan
2017
Essays in behavioral economics: Applying prospect theory to auctions
A Ratan
University of Maryland, College Park, 2010
2010
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Articles 1–15