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Ichiro Obara
Ichiro Obara
Bestätigte E-Mail-Adresse bei econ.ucla.edu - Startseite
Titel
Zitiert von
Zitiert von
Jahr
Efficiency in repeated games revisited: The role of private strategies
M Kandori, I Obara
Econometrica 74 (2), 499-519, 2006
1542006
Belief-based equilibria in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with private monitoring
V Bhaskar, I Obara
Journal of Economic Theory 102 (1), 40-69, 2002
1452002
Firm reputation and horizontal integration
H Cai, I Obara
The RAND Journal of Economics 40 (2), 340-363, 2009
962009
Folk theorem with communication
I Obara
Journal of Economic Theory 144 (1), 120-134, 2009
922009
Mediated partnerships
D Rahman, I Obara
Econometrica 78 (1), 285-308, 2010
722010
The full surplus extraction theorem with hidden actions
I Obara
The BE Journal of Theoretical Economics 8 (1), 0000102202193517041399, 2008
552008
The maximum efficient equilibrium payoff in the repeated prisoners' dilemma
GJ Mailath, I Obara, T Sekiguchi
Games and Economic Behavior 40 (1), 99-122, 2002
392002
Towards a belief-based theory of repeated games with private monitoring: An application of POMDP
M Kandori, I Obara
Report.[694], 2010
272010
Private Strategy and E¢ ciency: Repeated Partnership Games Revisited
I Obara
University of Pennsylvania Working Paper, 2000
232000
Repeated games with general discounting
I Obara, J Park
Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute Working papers, 2015
212015
Collusion and heterogeneity of firms
I Obara, F Zincenko
The RAND Journal of Economics 48 (1), 230-249, 2017
17*2017
Mechanism design with information acquisition
S Bikhchandani, I Obara
Economic Theory 63 (3), 783-812, 2017
14*2017
Endogenous monitoring
M Kandori, I Obara
Unpublished manuscript, University of Tokyo and UCLA, 2004
142004
Less is more: an observability paradox in repeated games
M Kandori, I Obara
International Journal of Game Theory 34, 475-493, 2006
132006
Informational smallness and private monitoring
R McLean, I Obara, A Postlewaite
PIER Working Paper 11-029, University of Pennsylvania.[70], 2011
11*2011
Repeated games with general time preference
I Obara, J Park
working paper, 2014
62014
Automated equilibrium analysis of repeated games with private monitoring: a POMDP approach.
YJ Joe, A Iwasaki, M Kandori, I Obara, M Yokoo
AAMAS, 1305-1306, 2012
62012
Secret contracts for efficient partnerships
D Rahman, I Obara
University of Minnesota, Department of Economics, 2008-3, 2008
62008
Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring
R McLean, I Obara, A Postlewaite
Journal of Economic Theory 153, 191-212, 2014
42014
Reputation and information lag
V Bhaskar, I Obara
mimeo, 2011
32011
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