| Mechanism design with costly verification and limited punishments Y Li Journal of Economic Theory, 105000, 2020 | 49 | 2020 |
| Approximation in mechanism design with interdependent values Y Li Games and Economic Behavior 103, 225-253, 2017 | 33 | 2017 |
| Mechanism design with financially constrained agents and costly verification Y Li Theoretical Economics 16 (3), 1139-1194, 2021 | 15* | 2021 |
| Efficient Mechanisms with Information Acquisition Y Li Journal of Economics Theory 182, 279-328, 2019 | 10 | 2019 |
| Security-bid auctions with information acquisition Y Li, Z Huang Available at SSRN 3850243, 2023 | 4 | 2023 |
| Endogenous Labor Market Cycles Y Li, C Wang International Economic Review 63 (2), 849-881, 2022 | 2* | 2022 |
| An efficient ascending auction Y Li | 1 | 2013 |
| Collective Decision Through an Informed Designer Y Li, X Zhang Available at SSRN 3761473, 2022 | | 2022 |
| Essays in Mechanism Design Y Li University of Pennsylvania, 2017 | | 2017 |
Cheng WangSchool of Economics, Fudan UniversityVerified email at fudan.edu.cn
