| Too cool for school? Signalling and countersignalling N Feltovich, R Harbaugh, T To RAND Journal of Economics, 630-649, 2002 | 389 | 2002 |
| Do actions speak louder than words? An experimental comparison of observation and cheap talk J Duffy, N Feltovich Games and Economic Behavior 39 (1), 1-27, 2002 | 240 | 2002 |
| Reinforcement‐based vs. belief‐based learning models in experimental asymmetric‐information games N Feltovich Econometrica 68 (3), 605-641, 2000 | 234 | 2000 |
| Nonparametric tests of differences in medians: comparison of the Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney and robust rank-order tests N Feltovich Experimental Economics 6, 273-297, 2003 | 194 | 2003 |
| Does observation of others affect learning in strategic environments? An experimental study J Duffy, N Feltovich international Journal of Game theory 28, 131-152, 1999 | 153 | 1999 |
| Whatever you say, your reputation precedes you: Observation and cheap talk in the trust game J Bracht, N Feltovich Journal of public economics 93 (9-10), 1036-1044, 2009 | 142 | 2009 |
| Words, deeds, and lies: strategic behaviour in games with multiple signals J Duffy, N Feltovich The Review of Economic Studies 73 (3), 669-688, 2006 | 141 | 2006 |
| Correlated equilibria, good and bad: an experimental study J Duffy, N Feltovich International Economic Review 51 (3), 701-721, 2010 | 82 | 2010 |
| How sensitive are bargaining outcomes to changes in disagreement payoffs? N Anbarci, N Feltovich Experimental economics 16, 560-596, 2013 | 80 | 2013 |
| Critical values for the robust rank-order test N Feltovich Communications in Statistics-Simulation and Computation 34 (3), 525-547, 2005 | 78 | 2005 |
| Relative versus absolute speed of adjustment in strategic environments: responder behavior in ultimatum games DJ Cooper, N Feltovich, AE Roth, R Zwick Experimental Economics 6, 181-207, 2003 | 50 | 2003 |
| Do actions speak louder than words? Observation vs. cheap talk as coordination devices J Duffy, N Feltovich Games and Economic behavior 39 (1), 1-27, 2002 | 48 | 2002 |
| Experimental Evidence of a Sunk‐Cost Paradox: A Study of Pricing Behavior in Bertrand–Edgeworth Duopoly S Buchheit, N Feltovich International Economic Review 52 (2), 317-347, 2011 | 46 | 2011 |
| Efficiency in the trust game: an experimental study of precommitment J Bracht, N Feltovich International Journal of Game Theory 37, 39-72, 2008 | 45 | 2008 |
| A quantum metric of organizational performance: Terrorism and counterterrorism WF Lawless, M Bergman, J Louçã, NN Kriegel, N Feltovich Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory 13, 241-281, 2007 | 43 | 2007 |
| Thinking like a game theorist: Comment NT Wilcox, N Feltovich University of Houston Department of Economics working paper, 2000 | 42 | 2000 |
| Consensus seeking versus truth seeking WF Lawless, M Bergman, N Feltovich Practice Periodical of Hazardous, Toxic, and Radioactive Waste Management 9 …, 2005 | 40 | 2005 |
| Selection vs. accountability: An experimental investigation of campaign promises in a moral-hazard environment N Feltovich, F Giovannoni Journal of Public Economics 126, 39-51, 2015 | 39 | 2015 |
| Do positional goods inhibit saving? Evidence from a life-cycle experiment N Feltovich, OZ Ejebu Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 107, 440-454, 2014 | 39 | 2014 |
| The role of strategic uncertainty in games: An experimental study of cheap talk and contracts in the nash demand game N Feltovich, J Swierzbinski European Economic Review 55 (4), 554-574, 2011 | 39 | 2011 |
Nejat AnbarciProfessor Nejat Anbarci, Durham UniversityVerified email at durham.ac.uk
