The Lying-Misleading Distinction: A Commitment-Based Approach. E Viebahn Journal of Philosophy 118 (6), 2021 | 67 | 2021 |
How many meanings for ‘may’? The case for modal polysemy B Vetter, E Viebahn Philosophers' Imprint 16 (10), 1–26, 2016 | 63* | 2016 |
Lying with Presuppositions E Viebahn Nous 54 (3), 731–751, 2020 | 58 | 2020 |
Non-literal lies E Viebahn Erkenntnis 82, 1367-1380, 2017 | 53 | 2017 |
Ambiguity and zeugma E Viebahn Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (4), 749-762, 2018 | 36 | 2018 |
Can a question be a lie? An empirical investigation E Viebahn, A Wiegmann, N Engelmann, P Willemsen Ergo 8 (7), 175–217, 2021 | 31 | 2021 |
To lie or to mislead? F Timmermann, E Viebahn Philosophical Studies 178 (5), 1481-1501, 2021 | 25 | 2021 |
Lying with pictures E Viebahn The British Journal of Aesthetics 59 (3), 243-257, 2019 | 22 | 2019 |
Copredication, polysemy and context-sensitivity E Viebahn Inquiry 65 (8), 1066-1082, 2022 | 18 | 2022 |
Ways of using words: On semantic intentions E Viebahn Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (1), 93-117, 2020 | 17 | 2020 |
Counting stages E Viebahn Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2), 311-324, 2013 | 16 | 2013 |
Presentism, eternalism and where things are located E Viebahn Synthese 197 (7), 2963-2974, 2020 | 7 | 2020 |
True lies and Moorean redundancy A Wiegmann, E Viebahn Synthese 199 (5), 13053-13066, 2021 | 5 | 2021 |
Against context-sensitivity tests E Viebahn Grazer Philosophische Studien 88 (1), 2013 | 5 | 2013 |
Lying, Misleading, and Fairness E Viebahn Ethics 132 (3), 736-751, 2022 | 4 | 2022 |
Truth and directness in pictorial assertion L Lewerentz, E Viebahn Linguistics and Philosophy 46 (6), 1441-1465, 2023 | 3 | 2023 |
Semantic Pluralism E Viebahn | 3 | 2019 |
What does it take to tell a lie? E Viebahn Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Lying, 7, 2025 | 2 | 2025 |
True lies and attempted lies E Viebahn Inquiry, 1-12, 2024 | 2 | 2024 |
AI assertion P Butlin, E Viebahn Ergo, 2024 | 2 | 2024 |