| How many meanings for ‘may’? The case for modal polysemy B Vetter, E Viebahn Philosophers' Imprint 16 (10), 1–26, 2016 | 47* | 2016 |
| Lying with Presuppositions E Viebahn Nous 54 (3), 731–751, 2020 | 40 | 2020 |
| Non-literal lies E Viebahn Erkenntnis 82, 1367-1380, 2017 | 39 | 2017 |
| The lying-misleading distinction: A commitment-based approach E Viebahn The Journal of Philosophy 118 (6), 289-319, 2021 | 35 | 2021 |
| Ambiguity and zeugma E Viebahn Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (4), 749-762, 2018 | 25 | 2018 |
| Can a question be a lie? An empirical investigation E Viebahn, A Wiegmann, N Engelmann, P Willemsen OSF, Epub ahead of print, 2020 | 17* | 2020 |
| To lie or to mislead? F Timmermann, E Viebahn Philosophical Studies 178, 1481-1501, 2021 | 16 | 2021 |
| Lying with pictures E Viebahn The British Journal of Aesthetics 59 (3), 243-257, 2019 | 15 | 2019 |
| Counting stages E Viebahn Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2), 311-324, 2013 | 12 | 2013 |
| Ways of using words: on semantic intentions E Viebahn Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (1), 93-117, 2020 | 9 | 2020 |
| Copredication, polysemy and context-sensitivity E Viebahn Inquiry 65 (8), 1066-1082, 2022 | 6 | 2022 |
| Presentism, eternalism and where things are located E Viebahn Synthese 197 (7), 2963-2974, 2020 | 4 | 2020 |
| Against context-sensitivity tests E Viebahn Grazer Philosophische Studien 88 (1), 2013 | 4 | 2013 |
| True lies and Moorean redundancy A Wiegmann, E Viebahn Synthese 199 (5-6), 13053-13066, 2021 | 3 | 2021 |
| Semantic Pluralism E Viebahn | 3 | 2019 |
| Lying, Misleading, and Fairness E Viebahn Ethics 132 (3), 736-751, 2022 | 2 | 2022 |
| AI Assertion P Butlin, E Viebahn OSF Preprints, 2023 | | 2023 |
| An empirical perspective on pictorial lies E Viebahn, A Wiegmann OSF Preprints, 2023 | | 2023 |
| Repliken E Viebahn | | 2019 |
| Précis zu: Semantic Pluralism E Viebahn | | 2019 |
Barbara VetterProfessorin für theoretische Philosophie, FU BerlinVerified email at fu-berlin.de
