| Credence goods and fraudulent experts W Emons The RAND Journal of Economics 28, 107-119, 1997 | 685 | 1997 |
| Credence goods monopolists W Emons International Journal of Industrial Organization 19 (3-4), 375-389, 2001 | 241 | 2001 |
| Warranties, moral hazard, and the lemons problem W Emons Journal of Economic Theory 46 (1), 16-33, 1988 | 176 | 1988 |
| Expertise, contingent fees, and insufficient attorney effort W Emons International Review of Law and Economics 20 (1), 21-33, 2000 | 130 | 2000 |
| The theory of warranty contracts W Emons Journal of Economic Surveys 3 (1), 43-57, 1989 | 119 | 1989 |
| A note on the optimal punishment for repeat offenders W Emons International Review of Law and Economics 23 (3), 253-259, 2003 | 97 | 2003 |
| US‐style contingent fees and UK‐style conditional fees: agency problems and the supply of legal services W Emons, N Garoupa Managerial and Decision Economics 27 (5), 379-385, 2006 | 94* | 2006 |
| The market for used cars: new evidence of the lemons phenomenon W Emons, G Sheldon Applied Economics 41, 2867-2885, 2009 | 92* | 2009 |
| Escalating penalties for repeat offenders W Emons International Review of Law and Economics 27 (2), 170-178, 2007 | 89 | 2007 |
| Conditional versus contingent fees W Emons Oxford Economic Papers 59 (1), 89-101, 2007 | 89 | 2007 |
| On the limitation of warranty duration W Emons The Journal of Industrial Economics 37, 287-301, 1989 | 72 | 1989 |
| Accuracy versus falsification costs: The optimal amount of evidence under different procedures W Emons, C Fluet Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 25, 134-156, 2009 | 67 | 2009 |
| On the effectiveness of liability rules when agents are not identical W Emons, J Sobel The Review of Economic Studies 58 (2), 375-390, 1991 | 61 | 1991 |
| Efficient liability rules for an economy with non-identical individuals W Emons Journal of Public Economics 42 (1), 89-104, 1990 | 42 | 1990 |
| Playing it safe with low conditional fees versus being insured by high contingent fees W Emons American Law and Economics Review 8 (1), 20-32, 2006 | 38 | 2006 |
| Imperfect tests and natural insurance monopolies W Emons The Journal of Industrial Economics 49 (3), 247-268, 2001 | 37 | 2001 |
| Information, Märkte, Zitronen und Signale: Zum Nobelpreis an George Akerlof, Michael Spence und Joseph Stiglitz W Emons Wirtschaftsdienst 81 (11), 664-668, 2001 | 32 | 2001 |
| Subgame‐Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders W Emons Economic Inquiry 42 (3), 496-502, 2004 | 31 | 2004 |
| Optimal Leniency Programs When Firms Have Imperfect Cumulative and Asymmetric Evidence M Blatter, W Emons, S Sticher Review of Industrial Organization, 2017 | 29* | 2017 |
| Non-comparative versus comparative advertising of quality W Emons, C Fluet International Journal of Industrial Organization 30 (4), 352-360, 2012 | 29* | 2012 |
Claude FluetUniversité LavalBestätigte E-Mail-Adresse bei fsa.ulaval.ca
