Detecting auctioneer corruption: Evidence from Russian procurement auctions P Andreyanov, A Davidson, V Korovkin Unpublished manuscript. https://editorialexpress. com/cgi-bin/conference …, 2017 | 37* | 2017 |
Robust mechanism design of exchange P Andreyanov, T Sadzik The Review of Economic Studies 88 (2), 521-573, 2021 | 11 | 2021 |
Secret reserve prices by uninformed sellers P Andreyanov, EH Caoui Quantitative Economics 13 (3), 1203-1256, 2022 | 6 | 2022 |
Mechanism choice in scoring auctions P Andreyanov Working Paper. Uni, 2018 | 6 | 2018 |
Past Performance and Procurement Outcomes P Andreyanov, F Decarolis, R Pacini, G Spagnolo Working paper, 2023 | 3 | 2023 |
Nonparametric inference on counterfactuals in first-price auctions P Andreyanov, G Franguridi arXiv preprint arXiv:2106.13856, 2021 | 2 | 2021 |
Scoring and Favoritism in Optimal Procurement Design P Andreyanov, I Krasikov, A Suzdaltsev Working Paper, 2023 | 1 | 2023 |
Simple nonparametric inference for first-price auctions via bid spacings P Andreyanov, G Franguridi arXiv preprint arXiv:2106.13856, 2021 | 1 | 2021 |
Essays on Prior-Free Mechanism Design P Andreyanov University of California, Los Angeles, 2019 | 1 | 2019 |
Optimal robust divisible mechanisms for public goods P Andreyanov, J Copic, B Jeong Working paper, 2018 | 1 | 2018 |
Optimal Robust Double Auctions P Andreyanov, J Park, T Sadzik | | 2022 |
XXI'st century media capture E Abramov, P Andreyanov | | 2018 |