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Strategic communication with lying costs
N Kartik
Review of Economic Studies 76 (4), 1359-1395, 2009
7152009
Credulity, lies, and costly talk
N Kartik, M Ottaviani, F Squintani
Journal of Economic theory 134 (1), 93-116, 2007
4672007
Would I lie to you? On social preferences and lying aversion
S Hurkens, N Kartik
Experimental Economics 12 (2), 180-192, 2009
4002009
Selecting Cheap‐Talk Equilibria
Y Chen, N Kartik, J Sobel
Econometrica 76 (1), 117-136, 2008
3252008
Signaling character in electoral competition
N Kartik, RP McAfee
The American economic review 97 (3), 852-870, 2007
3102007
Opinions as incentives
YK Che, N Kartik
Journal of Political Economy 117 (5), 815-860, 2009
2842009
Optimal contracts for experimentation
M Halac, N Kartik, Q Liu
The Review of Economic Studies 83 (3), 1040-1091, 2016
1872016
Contests for experimentation
M Halac, N Kartik, Q Liu
Journal of Political Economy 125 (5), 1523-1569, 2017
1612017
Pandering to Persuade
YK Che, W Dessein, N Kartik
American Economic Review 103 (1), 47-79, 2013
1432013
Implementation with evidence
N Kartik, O Tercieux
Theoretical Economics 7, 323-355, 2012
1312012
Herding with collective preferences
SN Ali, N Kartik
Economic Theory 51 (3), 1-26, 2011
129*2011
Muddled information
N Kartik, A Frankel
Journal of Political Economy 127 (4), 1739-1776, 2017
104*2017
Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
N Kartik, O Tercieux, R Holden
Games and Economic Behavior 83, 284-290, 2014
932014
Information aggregation in standing and ad hoc committees
SN Ali, JK Goeree, N Kartik, TR Palfrey
The American Economic Review 98 (2), 181-186, 2008
642008
A note on cheap talk and burned money
N Kartik
Journal of Economic Theory 136 (1), 749-758, 2007
61*2007
Candidates, Character, and Corruption
BD Bernheim, N Kartik
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 6 (2), 205-246, 2014
56*2014
Information revelation and pandering in elections
N Kartik, F Squintani, K Tinn
Columbia University, New York 36, 2015
55*2015
Informative cheap talk in elections
N Kartik, R Van Weelden
The Review of Economic Studies 86 (2), 755-784, 2019
532019
Information transmission with almost-cheap talk
N Kartik
Unpublished Manuscript, University of California San Diego, 2005
53*2005
Investment in concealable information by biased experts
N Kartik, FX Lee, W Suen
The RAND Journal of Economics 48 (1), 24-43, 2017
522017
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