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Ariel Schvartzman
Ariel Schvartzman
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Title
Cited by
Cited by
Year
Approximation schemes for a unit-demand buyer with independent items via symmetries
P Kothari, S Singla, D Mohan, A Schvartzman, SM Weinberg
2019 IEEE 60th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS …, 2019
292019
The menu complexity of “one-and-a-half-dimensional” mechanism design
RR Saxena, A Schvartzman, SM Weinberg
Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete …, 2018
212018
Optimal mechanism design for single-minded agents
NR Devanur, K Goldner, RR Saxena, A Schvartzman, SM Weinberg
Proceedings of the 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 193-256, 2020
162020
Condorcet-consistent and approximately strategyproof tournament rules
J Schneider, A Schvartzman, SM Weinberg
8th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, 35:1-35:20, 2016
162016
Smoothed analysis of multi-item auctions with correlated values
A Psomas, A Schvartzman, SM Weinberg
Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 417-418, 2019
142019
Approximately strategyproof tournament rules: On large manipulating sets and cover-consistence
A Schvartzman, SM Weinberg, E Zlatin, A Zuo
11th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, 3:1-3:25, 2019
92019
The fewest clues problem
ED Demaine, F Ma, A Schvartzman, E Waingarten, S Aaronson
Theoretical Computer Science 748, 28-39, 2018
92018
Coding in undirected graphs is either very helpful or not helpful at all
M Braverman, S Garg, A Schvartzman
8th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2017), 2017
92017
Bounds for the Communication Complexity of Two-Player Approximate Correlated Equilibria.
YK Ko, A Schvartzman
Electron. Colloquium Comput. Complex. 24, 71, 2017
32017
On Infinite Separations Between Simple and Optimal Mechanisms
A Psomas, A Schvartzman Cohenca, S Weinberg
Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 35, 4818-4829, 2022
22022
Network coding in undirected graphs is either very helpful or not helpful at all
M Braverman, S Garg, A Schvartzman
arXiv preprint arXiv:1608.06545, 2016
22016
Fine-grained buy-many mechanisms are not much better than bundling
S Assadi, V Kher, G Li, A Schvartzman
Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 123-152, 2023
12023
On Infinite Separations Between Simple and Optimal Mechanisms
C Alexandros Psomas, A Schvartzman, SM Weinberg
arXiv e-prints, arXiv: 2205.13039, 2022
2022
Circumventing Lower Bounds in Mechanism and Tournament Design
A Schvartzman Cohenca
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 2020
2020
Selling Partially-Ordered Items: Exploring the Space between Single-and Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design
NR Devanur, K Goldner, RR Saxena, A Schvartzman, SM Weinberg
2018
Bounds for the Communication Complexity of Approximate Correlated Equilibria
YK Ko, A Schvartzman
2017
Maximum Cardinality Matchings in Fully Dynamic Graphs
A Radhakrishnan, A Schvartzman
2014
Toward Fair and Strategyproof Tournament Rules for Tournaments with Partially Transferable Utilities
DM Pennock, A Schvartzman, E Xue
18.434-FINAL PROJECT CONCENTRATION OF MEASURE
A SCHVARTZMAN
CUTOFF FOR THE STAR TRANSPOSITION RANDOM WALK
J NOVAK, A SCHVARTZMAN
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